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The Supreme Court, the Florida Vote, 
and Equal Protection 
LARRY ALEXANDER* 
The Supreme Court majority in Bush v. Gore1 has taken a lot of flak 
for its ruling that the Florida count of undervotes violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Commentators, and 
not only those on the left, have labeled the Court’s reasoning as without 
basis in precedent, weak in its logic, and breathtakingly sweeping in its 
implications.2 For those inclined to suspect the justices of naked 
partisanship, the equal protection argument did nothing to allay those 
suspicions. 
It is argued in this Essay, however, that the case for an equal 
protection violation is supported both by precedent and logic and is not 
particularly sweeping in its implications.  Here is the basic point.  The 
Equal Protection Clause instructs the state to treat its citizens equally.3  
That means that when Florida is distributing some benefit or burden on a 
statewide basis, it may not distribute more of that benefit or burden to 
people in one part of the state than it does to people in other parts of the 
state unless it has a legitimate reason for doing so.  Thus, if Florida is 
distributing welfare checks as part of a statewide program, it may not 
 
 *  Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of 
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 1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 2. See Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 657 (2001); Lawrence H. Tribe, Comment, eroG v. hsuB and Its Disguises: 
Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170 (2001). 
 3. “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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give a recipient in northern Florida more money than a recipient in 
southern Florida without a good reason for the difference in treatment—
that the cost of living is higher in northern Florida than in southern 
Florida for example. 
This basic equal protection principle is applicable when the benefit to 
be distributed is the vote in a statewide election.  Florida cannot give 
northern Floridians two votes for governor or for U.S. senator while 
giving southern Floridians only one vote, or weight the vote of northern 
Floridians in such a way as to produce a comparable effect.4  The same 
principle applies to the vote for President of the United States.  
Presidential electors are selected, after all, not on a county-by-county 
basis, but on a statewide, winner-take-all basis. 
This equal protection principle is well established in Supreme Court 
precedents, particularly those involving reapportionment (the “one man, 
one vote” cases).5  But it is also acknowledged in Supreme Court cases 
that found the principle not to have been violated.  For example, in San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,6 the Court held that 
intrastate disparities among school districts in tax rates and expenditures 
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, despite the fact that similarly 
situated taxpayers and students faced different tax rates and received 
different amounts of educational resources depending upon the Texas 
school district in which they lived.  The Court held that intrastate 
differences such as these were justified by the value of “local control.”7  
After all, if one lives in San Antonio, one lives under different laws, 
faces different tax burdens, and receives different levels of public 
services than if one lives in Amarillo.  If all of these differences were 
unconstitutional, city, county, and other local governmental entities 
would have no reason to exist.  Real local control means that similarly 
situated people within the same state will be treated differently 
depending upon the political subdivision of the state in which they live. 
The value of local control, and its ability to constitutionally legitimate 
differences in treatment, is why the Court’s holding in Bush v. Gore does 
not mean that having punch card voting machines in some Florida 
counties but not in others is unconstitutional.  Most elections are local 
and are locally funded, and thus it is perfectly legitimate for Florida to 
allow county governments to choose their voting machines. 
The question then is: does the value of local control support letting 
each county election canvassing board count its county’s undervotes in a 
 
 4. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 
376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). 
 5. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562–64 & n.40; Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18. 
 6. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 7. Id. at 49–53. 
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different manner?  And here, the answer seems to be that there is no 
value in having local control of this matter.  Remember, we are dealing 
here only with those counties that used identical punch card machines.  
And we are dealing with a statewide election. 
There are two possible arguments supporting local control over the 
standard for what counts as a vote in a statewide election where the same 
voting machines are used in the localities in question.  One argument is 
that even though the machines are the same, the different counties may 
maintain the machines differently, resulting in different meanings of 
“dimpled” chads from county to county.  It does not appear that there 
was enough support in the record of this case for this basis for local 
control to substantiate it, much less to justify the actual differences 
among the canvassing boards in deciding which undervotes were 
actually votes. 
The other argument for local control rests on an analogy to criminal 
cases in which different juries decide in different cases such matters as 
whether the defendant had “criminal intent.”  If we let different juries 
decide whether criminal intent exists without constraining them by rules 
to ensure that their decisions are consistent, why should we not let 
different canvassing boards decide on the existence of  “voter intent” 
without constraining them by rules to ensure their uniformity? 
Decisions about criminal intent, however, are disanalogous to 
decisions about voter intent in two material ways.  First, at stake in the 
former is making sure beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
really did have the required intent.  Uniformity of results is far less 
important than their correctness.  In gauging voter intent, however, what 
is important for the voter is not that his vote will be correctly counted 
but rather that the candidate who received his vote wins the election if 
that candidate did indeed receive the most votes.  A uniform rule for 
determining voter intent, while it will lead to incorrect determinations in 
particular cases, is unlikely to have a skewing effect in favor of one 
candidate over another.  The errors should be evenly dispersed in the 
proportions in which the voters preferred the various candidates.  Thus, 
the important value—that the candidate that most voters intended to vote 
for win—will be preserved under uniform rules for gauging voter intent, 
even if particular ballots are judged incorrectly. 
The second way that determinations of criminal intent are different 
from determinations of voter intent in the circumstances of Florida is 
that there are an indefinite number of factors and therefore types of 
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evidence that bear on the former, whereas the latter is made based only 
on the marks on a mute ballot.  Indeed, the Court itself mentioned this 
difference between the two types of determinations.8  The relevance of 
the difference is that a uniform rule or rules for assessing voter intent is 
feasible, whereas the indefinite number of multifarious factors that go 
into determining criminal intent could never be captured in a 
determinate, uniformly administrable rule or set of rules. 
Moreover, even where more factors are relevant to the determination 
than are relevant to assessing voter intent, the Court has held that 
uniformly administrable standards are constitutionally required to 
protect against unequal allocations of important rights.  For example, the 
Court has held that governmental permissions to engage in expressive 
activities such as parades and charitable solicitations must be allocated 
under determinate rules to ensure evenhanded treatment of proponents of 
different viewpoints.9  Those cases directly support the Court’s holding 
in Bush v. Gore. 
Thus, there are no good arguments for local control over determining 
voter intent that trump the constitutional value of intrastate equal 
treatment of voters.  The seven justices who came to this conclusion 
were firmly on the side of constitutional precedent and policy.  The stay 
ordered by the five justice majority may have been questionable,10 but 
the constitutional right on which it was based was not. 
 
 
 8. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 106 (2000). 
 9. See, e.g., Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 
636–37 (1980); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557–58 (1965). 
 10. Bush, 531 U.S. at 110–11. 
